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This event-related brain potential (ERP) study aimed at bridging two hitherto widely
separated domains of cognitive neuroscience. Specifically, we combined the analysis of
cognitive control in a cued task-switching paradigm with the fundamental question of how
uncertainty is encoded in the brain. Two functional models of P3 amplitude variation in
cued task-switching paradigms were put to an empirical test: (1) According to the P3b
surprise hypothesis, parietal P3b waveforms are related to surprise over switch cues.
(2) According to the P3a entropy hypothesis, frontal P3a waveforms are associated with
entropy over switch outcomes. In order to examine these hypotheses, we measured the
EEG while sixteen healthy young participants performed cued task-switching paradigms
closely modeled to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). We applied a factorial
design, with number of tasks (two vs. three viable tasks), cue explicitness (task cuing vs.
transition cuing), and cue contingency (prospectively-signaled cuing vs. feedback-based
cuing) as independent variables. The ERP results replicated the commonly reported P3b
effect associated with task switches, and further showed that P3a amplitudes were
related to the entropy of switch outcomes, thereby supporting both hypotheses. Based
on these ERP data, we suggest that surprise over task switches, and entropy over switch
outcomes, constitute dissociable functional correlates of P3b and P3a ERP components
in task-switching paradigms, respectively. Finally, a theoretical integration of the findings
is proposed within the framework of Sokolov’s (1966) entropy model of the orienting
response (OR).
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INTRODUCTION
In task-switching paradigms, one of several viable stimulus-
response mappings (also referred to as task sets) needs to be
executed at any one time, based on contextual information pro-
vided by instructions or by other stimuli (cued task-switching;
see Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010; for reviews). Task-switching
paradigms thus provide dynamic environments which involve
frequent state transitions, and which thereby probe contextual
adjustment by the performers. Task-switching paradigms are
often considered benchmark in research on neurocognitive mech-
anisms of executive control (Shallice et al., 2008; Nyhus and
Barceló, 2009; Kopp and Wessel, 2011) since deficient contextual
adjustment represents one of the hallmarks of executive dys-
functions which occur in some brain-lesioned patients (Kopp,
2012).
In principle, there exist two categories of models of cognitive
control in task-switching paradigms, which we here refer to as
meta-level models and task-level models (see Mayr et al., 2013,
for a more detailed discussion). Meta-level models assume that a
task switch “. . . necessitates a process (or a set of processes) that
operates on an abstract, hierarchically higher level than that of
specific tasks” (Mayr et al., 2013; p. 491). However, Kiesel et al.
(2010) concluded that the necessity of higher-level control has
not yet been settled in the relevant literature. Task-level models
assume that task control can be established exclusively through
mutual competition between task sets, without any requirement
of higher-level processes which should be related to the need to
switch back and forth between task sets (e.g., Gilbert and Shallice,
2002; Logan and Bundesen, 2003).
Conceptualizing meta-level task control as an all-or-none phe-
nomenon may be an inadequate oversimplification of a contin-
uously variable phenomenon. For example, the dynamics of task
control might necessitate the contribution of meta-level processes
to the degree that decisions about task sets are uncertain (Kepecs
andMainen, 2012). Figure 1 depicts two state transition diagrams
which illustrate task switching under certainty and under uncer-
tainty. Specifically, inspection of Figure 1 reveals that transitions
between task sets can be conducted with certainty on two-task
paradigms, whereas three-task paradigms imply uncertain transi-
tions between task sets. This consideration led to the present study
which focuses on task-set uncertainty. Our study thereby touches
the fundamental question of how uncertainty influences behavior
and how it is encoded in the brain (Bach and Dolan, 2012; Badre
et al., 2012).
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Berg, 1948; Grant
and Berg, 1948; Heaton et al., 1993) represents a clinical
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FIGURE 1 | Task-switching paradigms considered as dynamic
environments which involve frequent state transitions. Left panel: The
simple diagram shows state transitions when two tasks are viable. The red
arrow indicates that S1 passes on to S2 (i.e., switching between task sets
consists of a one-alternative choice). The blue arrow illustrates the
alternative switch between task sets. Right panel: The diagram shows
state transitions when three tasks are viable. The red arrows indicate that
S1 passes on to S2 or to S3 (i.e., switching between task sets consists of a
two-alternative choice). The blue arrows illustrate possible other task
switches.
benchmark task-switching paradigm (Milner, 1963; Nyhus and
Barceló, 2009; Kopp andWessel, 2011), since patients with frontal
brain damage commit more errors on the WCST than patients
with non-frontal damage (Barceló and Knight, 2002; Demakis,
2003). The WCST possesses two highly specific, yet important
characteristics: (1) WCST stimuli differ with regard to the color,
shape, and number of depicted objects, and these three stimulus
dimensions define three viable tasks. (2) Further, to cite the orig-
inal articles: “As the S [subject] sorted the response cards he was
informed whether he was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.” (Berg, 1948, p. 16;
Grant and Berg, 1948, p. 405). Thus, solely “wrong”-cues, follow-
ing erroneous sorts, signal the need to switch task sets, but they
do not indicate the currently prevailing task on the WCST. Taken
together, there are at least three hypothetical explanations for why
the WCST is found to be one of the few task-switching paradigms
with documented sensitivity for frontal lobe dysfunction (Barceló
and Knight, 2002; Demakis, 2003). (1) The WCST may place
high load on working memory (the memory load hypothesis).
(2) Successful performance on the WCST may hinge on effi-
cient action-outcome monitoring (the contingency hypothesis).
(3) The WCST may challenge task switching under uncertainty
(the uncertainty hypothesis). The rationale of each of these three
hypotheses will be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
The memory load hypothesis rests on the fact that contextual
cues on the WCST are transition cues, indicating that task sets
need to be changed, without specifying which of the three tasks is
currently effective, whereas task cues would provide explicit infor-
mation about the currently effective task. Schneider and Logan
(2007) suggested that transition cues place greater demands on
the retrieval of task sets in comparison to task cues. Forstmann
et al. (2005) showed functional activation of lateral prefrontal
areas by transition cues, but not by task cues. Further, based
on event-related brain potential (ERP) recordings, West et al.
(2011) reported that transition cues evoked more pronounced
frontal positivities than task cues did. This analysis led to one of
our experimental manipulations (cue explicitness) in which labels
such as “switch” (rather than “wrong” as in the original WCST)
and “repeat” (rather than “right” as in the original WCST) were
used for transition-cuing, whereas the labels “color,” “shape,”
and “number” constituted the stimulus material for explicit task
cuing.
The contingency hypothesis focuses on the fact that contex-
tual cuing rests on feedback stimuli on the WCST, such that
successful performance requires efficient action-outcome mon-
itoring (Kopp and Wessel, 2011). Action-outcome prediction
(Alexander and Brown, 2010, 2011) has been considered to form
the basis of performance monitoring, a widely studied frontal
function (Gehring and Knight, 2000; Ullsperger et al., 2002;
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Wessel et al., 2012). Throughout this
article, we call the feedback-based method of contextual cuing
feedback-based (F-B) cuing. In contrast to F-B cuing, many task-
switching paradigms provide information about the currently
effective task by delivering contextual cues before the appearance
of the imperative stimuli. Throughout this article, this contextual
cuing method will be called prospectively-signaled (P-S) cuing.
This analysis led to another experimental manipulation (cue con-
tingency), in which we compared the effects of F-B cues with the
effects of P-S cues, as further described below.
Figure 2 illustrates event structures over time within the initial
three trials of task runs, separately for P-S cuing and for F-B cuing.
It can be seen that cues (e.g., C1; read: “cue on trial 1”) precede
targets (e.g., T1; read: “target on trial 1”) on P-S cuing conditions,
such that R1 (read: “response on trial 1”) will be correct (in the
“ideal” performer). In contrast, because targets (e.g., T1) precede
cue/feedback events (e.g., C/FB1; read: “cue/feedback on trial 1”)
on F-B cuing conditions, R1 will necessarily be incorrect (even in
the “ideal” performer). As a corollary, while first trials are state-
transition trials on both cuing conditions, set shifts are expected
to occur on first trials on P-S cuing conditions, whereas set shifts
are expected to occur on second trials on F-B cuing conditions
(see Table 1).
Further, the green curved arrows in Figure 2 indicate that P-S
cues inform about the occurrence of state transitions vs. repeti-
tions, irrespective of performance accuracy. Feedback informa-
tion about performance accuracy is solely provided by additional
feedback stimuli in P-S cuing paradigms (red curved arrows).
Thus, task cues and feedback stimuli are dispersed in time within
each trial on P-S cuing conditions. This characteristic of P-S cuing
differs from F-B cuing where stimuli concomitantly serve as task
cues and feedback stimuli (hence the notation C/FB, indicating
that these events are hybrid cue and feedback events; red curved
arrows).
The simplest way to evaluate the uncertainty hypothesis is to
manipulate the number of viable tasks (cf. Figure 1). Subjects
need to handle three viable task sets on the WCST, (i.e., to inhibit
the previous set, e.g., “shape,” and to consider the other two
sets for responding, e.g., “color” and “number”), whereas the
use of two tasks is common in many task-switching experiments
(Kiesel et al., 2010). Thus, as illustrated in Figure 1, whereas the
WCST incorporates two-alternative choice (2AC) task-set deci-
sions, many task-switching paradigms demand one-alternative
choice (1AC) task-set decisions (i.e., to inhibit the previous set,
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FIGURE 2 | The temporal sequence of events on P-S cuing and on F-B
cuing conditions. The figure illustrates the initial three trials of task runs.
Cx , task cue on trial x{x = 1 . . .3}; FBx , feedback stimulus on trial
x{x = 1 . . .3}; C/FBx , hybrid cue/feedback stimulus on trial x{x = 1 . . . 3};
Tx , target stimulus on trial x{x = 1 . . .3}; Rx , response on trial x{x = 1 . . . 3}.
CTI, cue-target interval (3 s); RCI, response-cue interval (3 s). Curved arrows
indicate the contingencies: Cx -cues inform about possible state transitions,
i.e., the currently effective task relative to the task that was effective on the
previous trial on the P-S cuing condition; additional FBx -feedback stimuli
inform about the correctness of the response, Rx , on the P-S cuing condition.
Specifically, C1-cues (shown in blue) require set shifts, and FB1-feedback
stimuli (shown in orange) enable evaluating the task-set decision.
C/FBx -hybrid stimuli inform about the correctness of the response, Rx , on
the F-B cuing condition. In the absence of other information, this feedback
simultaneously serves as contextual information about possible state
transitions. Specifically, a set shift is required when C/FB1-stimuli (shown in
blue) signal that R1 was erroneous, whereas C/FB2-stimuli (shown in orange)
enable evaluating the task-set decision.
Table 1 | The table shows the initial three trials of task runs for
clarification of our nomenclature.
First trial Second trial Third trial
State transition State repetition1 State repetition2
P-S cuing Set shift First set repetition Set repetition
F-B cuing Set repetition (error) Set shift First set repetition
Set shifts, but not state transitions, are distributed across different trials on P-S
cuing and F-B cuing conditions.
e.g., “shape,” and to consider the other set for responding, e.g.,
“color,” when “number” is not a viable alternative). Note further
that explicit task cuing generally implies 1AC task-set decisions,
irrespective of the number of viable rules, because explicit task
cues (e.g., “color”) specify the correct task directly.
The factorial combination of cue explicitness (task cuing
vs. transition cuing), cue contingency (P-S vs. F-B cuing), and
number of tasks (two vs. three tasks) led to differential dynam-
ics of task-set decisions, as shown in Table 2. Decisions (D)
to switch task sets follow C1, and the presentation of FB1
(read: “feedback on trial 1”) allows to evaluate (E) their cor-
rectness within the first trial on P-S cuing conditions. In con-
trast, decisions to switch sets task sets follow C/FB1 (which
indicates erroneous performance), and evaluating their correct-
ness is not possible before C/FB2 on the second trial on F-B
cuing conditions. Table 2 offers an overview over the various
possibilities, basically showing the occurrence of 1AC task-set
Table 2 | Task switching under certainty/uncertainty across the initial
three trials of task runs.
P-S cuing C1 FB1 C2 FB2 C3 FB3
Task (2, 3 tasks) D:1AC E:1AC
Transition (2 tasks) D:1AC E:1AC
Transition (3 tasks) D:2AC E:2AC (E:1AC)
F-B cuing C/FB1 C/FB2 C/FB3
Task (2, 3 tasks) D:1AC E:1AC
Transition (2 tasks) D:1AC E:1AC
Transition (3 tasks) D:2AC E:2AC (E:1AC)
Cx, task cue on trial x {x = 1 . . .3}; FBx , feedback stimulus on trial x {x = 1 . . . 3};
C/FBx , hybrid cue/feedback stimulus on trial x {x = 1 . . . 3}; task (2,3 tasks),
two- and three-task task cuing; transition (2 tasks), two-transition cuing; tran-
sition (3 tasks), three-task transition cuing; D:, task-set decision; E:, decision
evaluation; 1AC, one-alternative choice; 2AC, two-alternative choice. Note that
2AC-decisions (D:2AC) occur exclusively on three-task transition cuing condi-
tions. These uncertain task decisions can be evaluated (E:2AC) through FB1 on
P-S cuing conditions and through C/FB2 on F-B cuing conditions. The bracketed
terms [i.e., (E:1AC)] indicate that an additional set switch (of the D:1AC-type)
is required in case that FB1 on P-S cuing conditions and C/FB2 on F-B cuing
conditions reveal incorrect initial task-set choices.
decisions, and their evaluation, on all explicit task-cuing condi-
tions (i.e., irrespective of the number of possible tasks) as well
as on transition-cuing conditions with only two viable tasks.
The sole exception from this pattern emerges on transition-cuing
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conditions with three viable tasks, where 2AC task-set deci-
sions, and their evaluation, are required. Thus, 2AC task-set
decisions are required on three-task transition-cuing conditions
(task-switching under uncertainty), whereas 1AC task-set deci-
sions are sufficient on all remaining conditions (task switching
under certainty).
In the remainder of our introduction, we apply two classi-
cal measures of uncertainty, i.e., surprise and entropy, to task-
switching. Specifically, we formalize surprise over switch cues and
entropy over negative outcomes in order to prepare the derivation
of hypotheses about the functional significance of two ERP mea-
sures which are consistently found in task-switching paradigms.
To begin with, it is well-known that surprise, I(X),
I(X = i) = −(log2 Pi) (1)
and entropy, H(X),
H(X = i) = −(Pi log2 Pi + (1 − Pi) log2(1 − Pi)) (2)
for a binary random variable X represent two different measures
of uncertainty (Shannon and Weaver, 1948). Figure 3 shows sur-
prise and entropy as a function of probability for a binary random
variable X [as in (1), (2)]. Note that the binary entropy func-
tion reaches a maximum at equal probabilities (i.e., at P = 0.5),
whereasmaximum surprise is associated with rareness or improb-
ability (i.e., when P → 0.0).
Let
Ps(n) = P(t(n) = s|t(n − 1))with s  {s (switch),
ns (no − switch)}; Pns = 1 − Ps (3)
denote a subjective probability estimate that a state transition
will occur on trial n {1, . . . ,N}, given a sequence t(n − 1) =
t(1), t(2), . . . , t(n − 1) of n − 1 former trials. Note that trial
t(n) in (3) has not yet been observed, therefore, a subjective
FIGURE 3 | The surprise function and the entropy function as a
function of probability over a binary random variable.
probability distribution Ps(n) for all possibilities {s, ns} on t(n)
is of interest. However, once s has been observed on t(n) (which
is only a single value s out of set {s, ns}), the respective subjective
probability Ps(n) can be used to calculate the degree of surprise
(Shannon andWeaver, 1948; Kolossa et al., 2013)
I(n) = − log2 Ps (n). (4)
Let
Pw (n) = P (t(n) = p|t(n − 1))withw  {w (wrong),
r (right) outcome}; Pr = 1 − Pw (5)
denote a subjective probability estimate that a “wrong”-outcome
will occur on trial t(n), given a sequence of n − 1 former tri-
als. Note that the outcome on t(n) has not yet been observed,
therefore, a subjective probability distribution Pw(n) for all pos-
sibilities {w, r} on t(n) is of interest. However, once w has been
observed on t(n), the respective subjective probability Pw(n) can
be used to calculate the degree of entropy (Shannon and Weaver,
1948; Kolossa et al., 2013)
H(n) = −(Pw(n) log2 Pw(n) + Pr(n) log2 Pr(n)). (6)
Figure 4 illustrates that the subjective probability estimates Pw(n)
need to be further conditioned on the serial position of t(n)
within task runs. There are only two instances where Pw(n) will
deviate from either P = 0.0 or P = 1.0, i.e., on the first trial on
uncertain P-S cuing conditions, and on the second trial on uncer-
tain F-B cuing conditions. Table 3 presents these conditional
probabilities Pw(n) as they result in an ideal performer.
The current study made use of ERP measures to examine
hypothetical explanations for the documented frontal lobe sen-
sitivity of the WCST. We now briefly discuss the P3b and P3a
variants of the P300 ERP component (see for Polich, 2007;
Duncan et al., 2009, for reviews) which are associated with uncer-
tainty (see Kopp, 2008, for a conceptual review) and which
play major roles in WCST-like task switching (Barceló, 2003).
Barceló et al. (2002) used a modified version of the WCST and
analyzed ERPs to the cue/feedback tones which were presented
after every trial. ERPs to switch cues/feedbacks showed large
frontal positivities (350–400ms) as well as large later parietal
positivities (550–600ms) which decreased in amplitude across
task runs. These ERP effects were interpreted as modulation of
parietal P3b and frontal P3a waveforms as a result of switching
task sets.
The observation of switch-related enhancements of parietal
P3b amplitudes is a ubiquitous finding in the task-switching
literature (Rushworth et al., 2002, 2005; Karayanidis et al., 2003,
2010; Kieffaber and Hetrick, 2005; Nicholson et al., 2005; Astle
et al., 2006, 2008; Swainson et al., 2006; Jost et al., 2008; Travers
and West, 2008; Periáñez and Barceló, 2009; Wylie et al., 2009;
Gajewski and Falkenstein, 2011). Further, it is well-recognized
that “surprising events elicit a large P300 component” (Donchin,
1981, p. 498) as specified in Donchin’s surprise hypothesis of P3b
amplitude modulations (see also Kolossa et al., 2013). Applied
to switch-related enhancements of parietal P3b amplitudes,
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FIGURE 4 | The temporal sequence of contextual cues and outcome
stimuli on P-S cuing and on F-B cuing conditions, separately for certain
and uncertain conditions. The figure illustrates the initial three trials of task
runs. Contextual cues are provided on P-S cuing, but not on F-B cuing
(depicted as []), which leads to erroneous task-set repetitions on
state-transition trials, and concomitantly to “wrong”-outcomes (Ow ). Note
the uncertainty of outcomes (“right” or “wrong,” Or/w ) on uncertain P-S
state-transition trials and on uncertain F-B state-repetition1 trials. Depending
on the outcome valence, task-set repetitions or task-set switches are
required on subsequent trials.
Table 3 | Conditional probabilities for negative trial outcomes in an
ideal performer, separately for P-S cuing and F-B cuing as well as for
certain and uncertain cuing conditions, further conditioned on the
serial position of trials within task runs.
First trial Second trial Third trial
State State State
transition repetition1 repetition2
P-S cuing, certain Pw = 0.0 Pw = 0.0 Pw = 0.0
P-S cuing, uncertain Pw = 0.5 Pw = 0.0 Pw = 0.0
F-B cuing, certain Pw = 1.0 Pw = 0.0 Pw = 0.0
F-B cuing, uncertain Pw = 1.0 Pw = 0.5 Pw = 0.0
cue-locked P3b amplitudes should be proportional to surprise
I(n), i.e.,
P3b(n) ∝ I(n) (7)
with I(n) as defined in (4), i.e., the surprise over task-set switches.
Barceló et al. (2002) found a rapid decline of frontal P3a
amplitudes across task runs which they interpreted as being
related to task-set uncertainty. Note that prominent P3a wave-
forms in response to cue/feedback events were also found in
other WCST-like task-switching studies (Kopp et al., 2005, 2006;
Barceló et al., 2006; Cunillera et al., 2012). Barceló et al. (2006)
put forward the hypothesis that modulations of P3a ampli-
tudes are generally related to the entropy which is conveyed
by eliciting stimuli. Applied to switch-related enhancements of
frontal P3a amplitudes, feedback-locked P3a amplitudes should
be proportional to entropy H(n), i.e.,
P3a(n) ∝ H(n) (8)
with H(n) as defined in (6) and in Table 3, i.e., the entropy
over outcomes, conditioned on task-set (un-)certainty and serial
position within task runs.
We started our analysis of WCST-like task switching with the
formulation of three hypotheses. Thememory load hypothesis led
us to expect strong frontal activities which should be evoked by
transition cues, as indicated by frontal P3a waveforms. In con-
trast, the contingency hypothesis led us to expect strong frontal
activities which should be evoked by F-B cues, again as indicated
by frontal P3a waveforms. Finally, the uncertainty hypothesis
led to two predictions. First, surprise over task-set switches,
being related to their rareness or improbability, should modulate
the parietal P3b. Second, entropy over switch outcomes should
modulate the frontal P3a, such that P = 0.5 outcomes should
elicit enhanced P3a amplitudes in comparison to both, P = 1.0




A group of sixteen healthy undergraduate psychology students
(M = 21.5 years; range 19–26 years; 14 females; 5 left-handed)
participated for course credit. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Nobody showed impairment in set switching
abilities as indicated by the time they required to complete Trail
Making Test A, 23.7 (M) ± 1.8 (SE) sec, and Trail Making Test B,
52.7 (M) ± 3.7 (SE) sec (Army Individual Test Battery, 1944).
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The authors confirm that the research has been conducted
according to all ethical standards imposed by their Ethics
Committee at the Technische Universität Braunschweig, who
approved the study. The study conforms to the Declaration of
Helsinki. Written informed consent was obtained by all partici-
pants, according to the procedures imposed and approved by the
above Ethics Committee.
STIMULUS MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
The experiment was controlled by the Presentation® software
(Albany, CA; http://www.neurobs.com). Target displays consisted
of four key cards per trial which appeared invariantly above
one stimulus card, all configured around the center of a com-
puter screen against white background (Eizo FlexScan T766 19′′;
Hakusan, Ishikawa, Japan; http://www.eizo.com/global). The
stimulus arrangement subtended a visual angle of 4◦ horizon-
tally and 2.5◦ vertically at a viewing distance of 1.5m. Participants
indicated their sorting choice by pressing one of four keys on a
standard computer keyboard which were mapped to the spatial
position of the key cards on the screen (“C,” left middle finger,
equaling choice of the outside left key card; “V,” left index fin-
ger, equaling choice of inside left key card; “N,” right index finger,
equaling choice of inside right key card; “M,” right middle fin-
ger, equaling choice of outside right key card). Target displays
remained on screen until a response was recognized. We selected
only those stimulus cards of the original 64-card version of the
WCST which share one and only one attribute with each of the
four key cards (i.e., the stimulus cards which match one key card
by color, another keycard by shape, and a third key card by num-
ber). Twenty-four stimulus cards fulfill this criterion (Nelson,
1976).
One single sequence of trials was generated pseudo-randomly
by one of the authors (Florian Lange). This particular sequence of
trials was utilized repeatedly throughout all experimental condi-
tions. Thus, the succession of stimulus cards was exactly identical
for all experimental conditions. Each stimulus card was presented
five times per condition, adding up to a total of 120 trials. The
sequence of trials included 31 rule switches, yielding an average
run length of 3.8 trials, with a range of three to five trials per
run. The succession of runs was identical for all two-task experi-
mental conditions such that these four conditions differed solely
with regard to cue explicitness and cue contingency. Likewise, the
succession of runs was identical for all three-task experimental
conditions were the sequence of trials consisted of eleven runs of
“color” and “shape” sorting, respectively, as well as ten runs of tri-
als which required sorting according to the “number” of objects
displayed on the stimulus cards.
Depending on the experimental condition, target stimuli were
differentially surrounded in time by cue and feedback stimuli
(see Figure 2). On P-S cuing conditions, cues (C) preceded tar-
get stimuli, indicating the effective rule explicitly or implicitly.
The time interval between cue onset and target onset amounted
to 3.000ms (cue-target interval, CTI). Subsequent cues were pre-
sented another 3.000ms after responses to the targets (response-
cue interval, RCI). Further, additional feedback stimuli (FB) were
presented during the RCI (i.e., 1.000ms after the responses) on
P-S cuing conditions. Feedback was provided by displaying the
German words for “correct” (“richtig”) and “wrong” (“falsch”),
respectively, in black capital letters at the center of the screen. On
F-B cuing conditions, responses were followed by a 3.000ms time
interval (RCI) until the onset of hybrid C/FB stimuli. This stimu-
lus informed, explicitly or implicitly, whether the applied set was
correct or not. The onset of C/FB stimuli was followed by another
interval of 3.000ms until the onset of the subsequent target stim-
uli (CTI). On transition-cuing conditions, C or C/FB stimuli
were composed of the German words for “repeat” (“bleiben”)
and “switch” (“wechseln”), respectively, superimposed on a black
rectangle. On task-cuing conditions, these stimuli consisted of
the German words for “color” (“Farbe”), “shape” (“Form”) and
“number” (“Zahl”). All word stimuli were of equal size (2◦ hor-
izontal visual angle, font: Arial 28), and their presentation dura-
tion amounted to 200ms. Note that the two (i.e., color, shape)
or three (i.e., color, shape, number) task cues occurred about
equally often (i.e., in 50% vs. 50% or in 33% vs. 33% vs. 33%
of the trials, respectively) on their respective two-task or three-
task experimental conditions. In contrast, “switch”-cues occurred
less frequently than “repeat”-cues on transition-cuing conditions
[i.e., “switch”-cues on around 25% (31 out of 120) of the trials
vs. “repeat”-cues on around 75% (89 out of 120) of the trials],
irrespective of the number of viable task rules on the particular
experimental condition.
Participants were instructed that their task would be to match
the stimulus card with one of the four key cards in accordance
with the appropriate sorting rule. They were further informed
that the prevailing sorting rule would change from time to time in
an unpredictable manner. They were told that cue stimuli or feed-
back stimuli, respectively, conveyed information about the correct
sorting rule. Participants were discouraged to guess whether or
not task rules might have changed on the current trial. They were
further instructed to prioritize response accuracy over response
speed. Prior to each experimental condition, participants’ under-
standing of the particular task at hand was ascertained by running
fifteen practice trials before the corresponding 120-trial sequence
was initiated.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The combination of number of viable task rules (two vs. three
rules), cue contingency (P-S cuing vs. F-B cuing), and cue explic-
itness (task cuing vs. transition cuing) provided a 2 × 2 × 2
factorial design. Participants were examined on two separate days
(time lag: M = 6 days ±0.9 (SE), range 1–13 days) since each
participant had to complete all eight experimental conditions
(adding to 960 trials per participant). The sequential design of the
experiment was balanced across participants, as follows: (1) 50%
of the participants (N = 8) started with all two-task conditions
on the first day, and 50% of the participants (N = 8) started with
all three-task conditions on the first day. (2)Within each day, 50%
of the participants (N = 4) started with P-S cuing, while 50%
of the participants (N = 4) started with F-B cuing. (3) Finally,
within each day and within each cue contingency condition, the
order of task cuing and transition cuing conditions was balanced
across participants, with 50% of the participants (N = 2) start-
ing with task cuing, and 50% of the participants (N = 2) starting
with transition cuing. Thus, the number of viable task rules
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constituted the slowest-changing factor, whereas cue explicitness
formed the fastest-changing factor.
ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHIC (EEG) RECORDINGS
Continuous EEG was recorded by means of a QuickAmps-
72 amplifier (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany; www.
brainproducts.com) and the BrainVision Recorder® Version
1.02 software (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany; www.
brainproducts.com) from frontal (F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8), central
(T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8), parietal (P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8), occipital
(O1, O2), and mastoid (M1, M2) sites. Ag-AgCl EEG electrodes
were used. They were mounted on an EasyCap (EasyCap,
Herrsching-Breitbrunn, Germany; www.easycap.de). Electrode
impedance was kept below 10 k. All EEG electrodes were
referenced to average reference. Participants were informed
about non-cerebral artifacts and asked to avoid eye and limb
movements as well as bucco-facial muscle activities (Picton et al.,
2000). Ocular artifacts were monitored by means of bipolar
pairs of electrodes positioned at the sub- and supraorbital ridges
(vertical electrooculogram, vEOG) and at the external ocular
canthi (horizontal electrooculogram, hEOG). The EEG and EOG
channels were amplified with a band-pass of 0.01–40Hz and
digitized at 250Hz.
Off-line analysis was performed by means of the BrainVision
Analyzer® Version 2.0 software (Brain Products, Gilching,
Germany; www.brainproducts.com). The contribution of ocu-
lar artifacts to the EEG was eliminated by applying independent
component analysis. A digital high-pass filter was applied to the
data (0.33Hz, 24 db/oct) in order to eliminate low-frequency
variations in the EEG signal which were associated with the occa-
sional occurrence of electro-dermal artifacts. Further artifacts
were removed semi-automatically [maximum allowed voltage
step per sampling point: 50μV;maximum allowed amplitude dif-
ference: 70μV; lowest allowed activity (max-min, interval length
100ms): 0.5μV]. In a second step, the accuracy of the initially
automatic artifact rejection was approved by visual inspection. By
applying these rejection criteria, less than one percent of trials had
to be discarded.
The EEG was then divided into epochs of 1.100ms duration,
starting 100ms before onset of the events of interest (see below).
A 100ms pre-stimulus baseline was subtracted from the sam-
pling points before the EEG was averaged off-line. Further, all
EEG electrodes were re-referenced to the algebraic average of
both mastoid electrodes, (M1+M2)/2. However, since the result-
ing ERP waveforms did not differ substantially between the two
reference methods, analyses and results are reported for average
reference only.
DATA ANALYSIS
SPSS 13.0 served for statistical analyses (IBM, Armonk, NY;
http://www-01.ibm.com/software/analytics/spss). Statistical sig-
nificance level was set at p < 0.01.
BEHAVIORAL DATA
For the eight experimental conditions, median response times
(RTs) were computed for each participant, separately for set-shift
trials and for first set-repetition trials (see Table 1). Comparing
response latencies across these trials allows quantifying behavioral
switch costs (Kiesel et al., 2010). These median RTs were subjected
to a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with number of
viable task rules (two vs. three), cue contingency (P-S cuing vs.
F-B cuing), cue explicitness (task cuing vs. transition cuing), and
trial (set-shift trial vs. first set-repetition trial, Table 1) as within-
subject factors. Only error-free trial sequences were selected for
analysis since we aimed at eliminating confounding contributions
of potential post-error slowing (Rabbitt, 1966). In addition, mean
error percentages across the initial three trials of task runs were
calculated (Table 1).
EEG DATA ANALYSIS
ERP measures were primarily derived from stimulus-locked
averages of error-less trials (which are denoted here as COR).
Averaging was generally conducted for Cx and FBx:cor, x = 1 . . . 3,
stimuli, i.e., separately for individual trials of task runs on P-S
cuing conditions (Figure 1). Likewise, on F-B cuing conditions,
averaging was conducted for C/FBy:cor , y = 2 . . . 3, stimuli. In
addition, ERPs were analyzed in response to C/FB1:inc stimuli on
all F-B cuing conditions (which served as switch cues). Finally,
ERPs evoked by FB1:inc on P-S cuing conditions and those elicited
by C/FB2:inc on F-B cuing conditions were analyzed when three
rules were viable and cuing was implicit (i.e., on transition cuing).
Note that sufficiently large numbers of error trials for analysis
were only available in these, but not in other, conditions (Table 4).
Mean P3a amplitudes were measured at electrode Fz in a
120ms (±60ms) interval around P3a peak latencies for each
participant. P3a peak latencies corresponded to the largest pos-
itive deflection in individual ERP waveforms within the latency
range between 340 and 440ms following stimulus onset. P3a
peak detection was performed on low-pass filtered individual
ERP waveforms (12Hz, 48 db/octave) which showed promi-
nent P3a waves. Specifically, individual ERP waveforms evoked
by FB1:cor and FB1:inc stimuli on three-task P-S transition cuing
conditions and by C/FB2:cor and C/FB2:inc stimuli on three-task
Table 4 | Mean (standard error) percentages of errors across
conditions and trials.
First trial Second trial Third trial
P-S cuing (Set shift) (First set
repetition)
Task (2 tasks) 3.91 (1.09) 1.17 (0.48) 0.78 (0.61)
Task (3 tasks) 4.69 (1.31) 0.76 (0.44) 0.98 (0.47)
Transition (2 tasks) 6.35 (1.55) 2.34 (1.19) 1.36 (0.57)
Transition (3 tasks) 49.61 (3.00) 5.27 (1.09) 1.37 (0.64)
F-B cuing (Set shift) (First set
repetition)
Task (2 tasks) 96.48 (2.50) 3.52 (1.24) 1.37 (0.49)
Task (3 tasks) 98.83 (0.39) 5.27 (1.50) 2.73 (0.85)
Transition (2 tasks) 96.68 (1.79) 3.13 (1.31) 3.13 (0.90)
Transition (3 tasks) 99.22 (0.35) 45.51 (2.17) 3.71 (0.96)
The table shows the initial three trials of task runs.
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F-B transition cuing conditions (i.e., the 2AC trials, Table 2)
served for determining individual P3a peak latencies. Averaged
individual P3a peak latencies were calculated for comparisons
with mean P3a amplitudes obtained from the remaining condi-
tions which did not show prominent P3a waves. Specifically, the
average latency, avP−S = (latency FB1:cor + latency FB1:inc)/2 on
three-task P-S transition cuing conditions served as the midpoint
of the 120ms (±60ms) latency window on the remaining P-S
cuing conditions, whereas the average latency, avF−B = (latency
C/FB2:cor + latency C/FB2:inc)/2 on three-task F-B transition
cuing conditions served as the midpoint of the 120ms (±60ms)
latency window on the remaining F-B cuing conditions. Mean
P3b amplitudes were generally measured at electrode Pz in the
interval between 450ms and 700ms following stimulus onset




As can be seen by inspection of Table 4, response accuracy gener-
ally increased across the initial three trials of task runs (Table 1).
Error proportions on these trials demonstrated strong differences
between P-S cuing and F-B cuing (Figure 2) as well as between
conditions involving 1AC and 2AC task-set decisions (Table 2).
Participants switched rarely to the wrong task set when con-
fronted with 1AC decisions on first trials on P-S cuing conditions,
whereas F-B cuing conditions produced errors on first trials by
default. As expected, set-shift trials (Table 1) provoked around
50% erroneous responses when they were associated with 2AC
task-set decisions (Table 2), i.e., on transition-cuing conditions
with three viable tasks, irrespective of cue contingency (i.e., on
P-S cuing and on F-B cuing conditions).
Comparing RTs by means of a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with
number of viable tasks (two vs. three), cue contingency (P-S
cuing vs. F-B cuing), cue explicitness (task cuing vs. transition
cuing), and trial (set-shift trial vs. first set-repetition trial) as
within-subject factors revealed a significant effect of the trial fac-
tor [F(1, 15) = 14.94, p < 0.01], indicating the general occurrence
of RT switch costs across experimental conditions (set-shift trials
M = 1.109ms; first set-repetition trials M = 1.009ms), since no
other main or interaction effect proved significant (all p > 0.02).
ERP RESULTS
The analysis of the ERP waveforms has three main parts: (1)
confirmatory evaluation of the P3b surprise hypothesis, (2) con-
firmatory evaluation of the P3a entropy hypothesis, and (3)
exploratory evaluation of outcome valence effects.
EVALUATION OF THE P3b SURPRISE HYPOTHESIS
Switch-related effects on cue-locked ERP waveforms can be
gleaned from inspection of Figure 5 by comparing ERPs (a)
evoked byC1 (switch) cues vs. those elicited byC2 andC3 (repeat)
cues on P-S cuing conditions, and (b) evoked by C/FB1:inc
(switch) stimuli vs. those elicited by C/FB2:cor and C/FB3:cor
(repeat) stimuli on F-B cuing conditions (Figure 2).
As a proxy for switch-related effects, we compared C1-locked
vs. C3-locked P3b waveforms on P-S cuing conditions and
C/FB1:inc-locked vs. C/FB3:cor-locked P3b waveforms on F-B
cuing conditions. The resulting 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with
number of viable tasks (two vs. three), cue contingency (P-S cuing
vs. F-B cuing), cue explicitness (task cuing vs. transition cuing),
and trial (first trial vs. third trial) as within-subject factors showed
a significant explicitness by trial interaction, F(1, 15) = 29.01, p <
0.01, indicating more pronounced P3b amplitude switch-related
effects on transition cuing conditions compared to task cuing
conditions. Separate analyses for the two levels of cue explicitness
revealed that P3b amplitudes showed significant switch-related
effects on both conditions, F(1, 15) = 25.33, p < 0.01 (task-cuing
condition), F(1, 15) = 166.51, p < 0.01 (transition-cuing condi-
tion). Thus, we found evidence for switch-related effects on
parietal P3b amplitudes as they are consistently reported in the
task-switching literature (Karayanidis et al., 2010). Over and
above this often replicated finding, the switch-related effects
on parietal P3b amplitudes were modulated by cuing method
such that more pronounced switch-related effects occurred on
transition-cuing conditions.
EVALUATION OF THE P3a ENTROPY HYPOTHESIS
TwoANOVAswere conducted to evaluate the hypothesis. The first
ANOVA targeted the effects of post-switch outcome uncertainty
(i.e., FB1-locked P3a amplitudes on P-S cuing conditions and
C/FB2-locked P3a amplitudes on F-B cuing conditions) across
all experimental conditions (Figure 5). Inspection of the ERP
waveforms reveals that pronounced P3a waveforms were solely
evoked by FB1- and by C/FB2-feedback stimuli on three-task
transition-cuing conditions, i.e., when the correctness of task-set
decisions was unpredictable. This impression was corroborated
by the results of the 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with number of viable
tasks (two vs. three), cue contingency (P-S cuing vs. F-B cuing)
and cue explicitness (task cuing vs. transition cuing) as within-
subject factors. This ANOVA showed significant effects of number
of tasks, F(1, 15) = 27.89, p < 0.01, cue explicitness, F(1, 15) =
45.01, p < 0.01, as well as of the number of tasks by cue explic-
itness interaction, F(1, 15) = 24.92, p < 0.01, with all remaining
F-values < 1. The interaction between number of viable tasks
and cue explicitness is illustrated in Figure 6 (left panel). Separate
ANOVAs were performed on each number of tasks condition to
further parse the two-way interaction. These analyses revealed
that P3a amplitudes showed significant cue explicitness effects
on three-task conditions, F(1, 15) = 37.13, p < 0.01 (task cuing:
M = −0.98μV, transition cuing: M = 5.00μV), but not on
two-task conditions, F(1, 15) = 5.83, p > 0.01 (task cuing: M =
−1.40μV, transition cuing: M = −0.60μV). Thus, post-switch
outcome events evoked enhanced P3a amplitudes specifically
when three viable tasks were combined with transition cues.
The second ANOVA was performed as a direct test for the P3a
entropy hypothesis. Inspection of Table 4 reveals that negative-
outcome probabilities across task runs on the three-task F-B
transition cuing condition approached the P = 1.0, P = 0.5,
and P = 0.0 values that were predicted for ideal performers
(Table 3). Inspection of Figure 3 reveals that the P3a entropy
hypothesis predicts enhanced P3a amplitudes elicited by P =
0.5 outcomes in comparison to both, P = 1.0 and P = 0.0 out-
comes, which should indistinguishably evoke less prominent P3a
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FIGURE 5 | ERP waveforms. (A) ERP waveforms obtained on P-S cuing
conditions. “task,” task-cuing conditions (two-task, three-task conditions)
with Cx , task cue on trial x{x = 1 . . . 3}; FBx : cor , correct feedback stimulus
on trial x{x = 1 . . .3}. “transition”, transition-cuing conditions (two-task,
three-task conditions) with Cx = task cue on trial x{x = 1 . . .3}; FBx : cor =
correct feedback stimulus on trial x{x = 1 . . . 3} and FB1:inc , incorrect
feedback stimulus on trial 1. (B) ERPs waveforms obtained on F-B cuing
conditions. “task,” task-cuing conditions (two-task, three-task conditions)
with C/FBx , hybrid cue/feedback stimulus on trial x{x = 1 . . .3; “cor,” correct;
“inc,” incorrect}. “transition,” transition-cuing conditions (two-task, three-task
conditions) with C/FBx , hybrid cue/feedback stimulus on trial x{x = 1 . . . 3;
“cor,” correct; “inc,” incorrect}.
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FIGURE 6 | Mean (standard error) P3a amplitudes at Fz. Left panel: The
interaction between cue explicitness and number of tasks reveals that P3a
amplitudes vary as a function of post-switch outcome uncertainty which is high
on three-task transition-cuing conditions and low on all remaining conditions.
Right panel: P3a amplitudes follow the entropy function over outcome events
across the initial three trials of task runs on the uncertain F-B cuing condition.
waveforms. The omnibus ANOVA on P3a amplitudes evoked by
C/FB2 (with Pw → 0.5), C/FB1 (with Pw → 1.0), and C/FB3
(with Pw → 0.0), outcomes, F(1, 15) = 21.39, p < 0.01, was fol-
lowed by planned Helmert contrasts, i.e., (1) C/FB2vs.(C/FB1 +
C/FB3)/2, F(1, 15) = 35.72, p < 0.01, and (2) C/FB1vs.C/FB3,
F(1, 15) = 1.20, p > 0.01, respectively. These results are shown in
Figure 6 (right panel), and they reveal that P3a amplitudes fol-
low the predicted entropy pattern. Taken together, both ANOVAs
devoted to the evaluation of the P3a entropy hypothesis showed
that amplitude variability in P3a was related to outcome uncer-
tainty, andmore specifically, to the entropy over switch outcomes.
ANALYSIS OF OUTCOME VALENCE EFFECTS
An exploratory comparison of ERP waveforms evoked by
(roughly equiprobable, cf. Table 4) positive and negative out-
comes was possible by comparing FB1:cor and C/FB2:cor against
FB1:inc and C/FB2:inc, respectively. The resulting 2 × 2 ANOVAs
with cue contingency (P-S cuing vs. F-B cuing) and outcome
valence (positive vs. negative) as within-subject factors showed
significant valence effects, F(1, 15) = 14.68, p < 0.01, for the P3b,
but not for the P3a, F(1, 15) = 5.83, p > 0.01, indicating enhanced
P3b, but not P3a, amplitudes evoked by negative outcomes com-
pared to positive outcomes. Implications of this finding will be
considered in the discussion section.
DISCUSSION
This study explored relationships between various aspects of
uncertainty and neuronal correlates of cognitive control in sev-
eral modifications of a cued task-switching paradigm. Subjects
switched between two or three task sets; contextual cues were
either (explicit) task cues or (implicit) transition cues, and
contextual cuing was either prospectively-signaled or feedback-
based in WCST-like task-switching paradigms (Barceló, 2003).
The manipulated variables of our experimental design exerted
negligible influence on behavioral switch costs, as evidenced by
their general and indistinguishable presence on all eight exper-
imental conditions. There were two separable ERP components
which could be easily distinguished by their topography. More
importantly, they were dissociated by their antecedent condi-
tions. The switch-related parietal P3b was commonly evoked
by switch-cues on all experimental conditions, with the switch-
related variability in P3b amplitude being more pronounced on
transition cuing. Further, the P3b distinguished negative and pos-
itive outcomes. A frontal P3a was evoked by feedback stimuli,
and it distinguished certain from uncertain task switching such
that solely uncertain switch outcomes elicited a prominent P3a,
irrespective of their valence. Each of these ERP components is
discussed in turn.
SWITCH-RELATED AMPLITUDE VARIABILITY IN P3b
The switch-related parietal P3b has been present in many dif-
ferent task-switching experiments (see Karayanidis et al., 2010
for review), so that it has been difficult to assign any specific
functional role to it. As one possibility, the switch-related P3b
may index the updating of “attentional set” in our study, i.e.,
the updating of the relevant features of those stimuli which later
determine action (Rushworth et al., 2005). However, since the
switch-related P3b has so often been observed in a diversity of
task-switching experiments, we prefer to interpret its occurrence
not as an index of switching between attentional sets, but rather
as indicating being unprepared to update (and, conversely, being
prepared to repeat) task sets, irrespective of the nature of the
particular sets concerned.
This idea was dubbed P3b surprise hypothesis in the intro-
duction to this article; it has the advantage of being generally
applicable to any kind of study. In fact, the historical roots of the
P3b surprise hypothesis (Donchin, 1981) lie in oddball paradigms
(e.g., Squires et al., 1976), and it is one of the major functional
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models of variability in parietal P3b amplitude (Kolossa et al.,
2013). The predictions of the surprise model are clear in terms of
how absolute switch probability should affect switch-related vari-
ability in P3b amplitude. As revealed by inspection of Figure 3,
surprise shows an asymmetrical course over binary probability
distributions, with maximal surprise when P → 0.0 and minimal
surprise when P → 1.0. Thus, surprise over switches (P = 0.25)
exceeds surprise over repetitions (P = 0.75) throughout all con-
ditions of our experiment, thereby offering an explanation for
the switch-related amplitude variability in P3b. In contrast to
this, the switch-related amplitude variability in P3b cannot be
accommodated to entropy over switches and repetitions, due to
the symmetrical course of entropy over binary probability distri-
butions. It is further of importance to note that a P3b occurred
in response to all switch cues, irrespective of the level switch
uncertainty.
It should be kept in mind, however, that our study does not
directly pertain to the P3b surprise model since we did not
manipulate absolute switch probability. How is task-switching
affected by switch probability? In one of the few studies of this
type, Monsell and Mizon (2006; Experiment 4) manipulated
switch probability (P = 0.25, P = 0.5, or P = 0.75) and showed
that behavioral switch costs decreased as switches became more
frequent. Further, Nessler et al. (2012) recently found that switch-
related amplitude variability in P3b disappeared completely
when switches and repetitions were equiprobable, and when
the sequential succession of switches and repetitions was highly
predictable. With regard to this, equiprobable switches and repe-
titions are, in and of itself, not sufficient for eliminating surprise
over task-set switches (Barceló et al., 2006). Consider the possible
succession of task-set switches (s) and task repetitions (r) over
three consecutive trials (n-2, n-1, n), given switch probability P =
0.5. The succession of two task repetitions, i.e. r(n−1)r(n), is equiv-
alent to the succession of a particular task (with tasks denoted a
or b), a(n−2)a(n−1)a(n), and a repetition after a switch, s(n−1)r(n),
equals the task sequence, b(n−2)a(n−1)a(n). Thus, if a cue on (n)
is the eliciting event, the short-term task probability for task a on
the preceding two trials, (n − 2) and (n − 1), equals P(a) = 0.75.
However, the succession of two task-set switches, i.e. s(n−1)s(n),
is equivalent to a(n−2)b(n−1)a(n), and a switch after a repetition,
r(n−1)s(n), equals the task sequence, b(n−2)b(n−1)a(n). Thus, if a
cue on (n) is the eliciting event, the short-term task probability
for task a on the preceding two trials (n − 2) and (n − 1) equals
P(a) = 0.25. The confound between switch probability (P = 0.5)
and short-term task probability (P(a(n−2)(n−1)/r(n)) = 0.75,
P(a(n−2)(n−1)/s(n)) = 0.25) will affect amplitude variability in
P3b (Squires et al., 1976; Kolossa et al., 2013).
The switch-related variability in P3b amplitude was more pro-
nounced on transition cuing. This modulation may be related
to the higher memory load which is associated with transi-
tion cues in comparison to task cues (Schneider and Logan,
2007). However, the P3b surprise hypothesis offers an alter-
native explanation for this result. Whereas switch probability
was held constant across transition-cuing and task-cuing condi-
tions, stimulus probability distinguished between the two condi-
tions. Specifically, task cuing implies physically identical switch
cues and repeat cues, their sole difference lying in their serial
position within task runs (switch cues initiate new task runs,
e.g., . . . bba . . . (switch cue underlined), whereas repeat cues do
not, . . . aaa . . . (repeat cues underlined)). This is different if one
considers stimuli on transition-cuing conditions, with physically
different switch cues and repeat cues (labeled switch and repeat),
e.g., . . . repeat repeat switch . . . (switch cue underlined). Given
switch probabilities of P = 0.25, transition switch cues occurred
less frequently than transition repeat cues. Thus, the sensory sur-
prise over switch cues on transition-cuing conditions exceeds the
sensory surprise over switch cues on task-cuing conditions, and
it is well known that sensory surprise contributes to the switch-
related variability in P3b amplitude (Nicholson et al., 2006; Jost
et al., 2008; Periáñez and Barceló, 2009).
The use of Karayanidis et al. (2009) “switch-to” (equivalent
to explicit task cues) vs. “switch away” (equivalent to transi-
tion cues) cuing may help to circumvent the sensory surprise
confound when comparisons between switches under task cuing
and switches under transition cuing are under scrutiny. In this
paradigm, task cuing relies on mapping tasks with particular
spatial positions. “Switch-to” cuing is mapped to the spatial posi-
tion of one particular task (thereby unambiguously defining a
task-set), whereas two viable tasks are cued by indicating spatial
positions with overlapping task mappings in “switch away” cuing
(thereby ambiguously defining two task sets).
FEEDBACK-RELATED AMPLITUDE VARIABILITY IN P3a
One of the basic findings of the study was that the frontal P3a
was evoked by feedback stimuli rather than by cue stimuli. The
appearance of a feedback-locked P3a is a common denominator
of prospectively-signaled and feedback-based task switching.
These data are in agreement with earlier work in this area. It
has repeatedly been reported that C/FB-events in WCST-like
task-switching paradigms evoke prominent P3a waveforms
(Barceló et al., 2002; Barceló, 2003; Kopp et al., 2005, 2006).
However, Cunillera et al. (2012) recently reported that switch cues
(C1-cues) and feedback events (FB1-events) evoked prominent
P3a waveforms of similar amplitudes on a prospectively-signaled,
three-task transition task-switching paradigm, seemingly con-
tradicting our finding of specifically outcome-evoked amplitude
variability in P3a. While the data converge with regard to the P3a
evoked by FB1-events, they seem to diverge with regard to the P3a
evoked by C1-cues. The contradictory pattern of results can be
explained by the instrumental character of C1-cues in Cunillera
et al.’s (2012) study in which they signaled the need for task-set
updating, akin to the role of FB1:INC-events in both studies.
Note that task-set switches are only one prerequisite for task-set
updating; the need for task-set updating also emerges when an
error occurred on the preceding trial. In contrast, C1-cues in
our study indicated task-set switches, irrespective of foregone
errors, as detailed above (cf. Figure 2). Thus, C1-cues provided
information about task-set switches and/or foregone errors in
Cunillera et al.’s study (i.e., they served as hybrid C/FB-stimuli).
In contrast, C1-cues solely informed about task-set switches,
irrespective of foregone errors, in the current study (i.e., they
served as pure C-stimuli).
There were some differences between the experimental
conditions which, apparently, exerted only minor effects on
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amplitude variability in P3a. First, the duration of the response-
stimulus intervals differed between prospectively-signaled (one
second) and feedback-based (three seconds) cuing conditions
(cf. Figure 2). Second, the semantic framing of feedback-
stimuli differed between prospectively-signaled (wrong, right)
and feedback-based (switch, stay) cuing conditions. Future stud-
ies should keep these variables constant, or they should address
their role by manipulating them systematically, despite the cur-
rent evidence of their seemingly negligible role for amplitude
variability in P3a.
The frontal P3a which was evoked by feedback stimuli on both
cuing-contingency conditions distinguished certain from uncer-
tain task switching such that solely uncertain switch outcomes
elicited a prominent P3a. Specifically, the entropy over switch
outcomes modulated the frontal P3a, such that uncertain switch
outcomes (Pw = 0.5) elicited enhanced P3a amplitudes in com-
parison to certain switch outcomes (i.e., Pw = 1.0 and Pw = 0.0).
Importantly, the P3a data thereby lend support to the P3a entropy
hypothesis according to which modulations of P3a amplitudes
are generally related to the entropy which is conveyed by eliciting
stimuli (Barceló et al., 2006).
Neither the memory load hypothesis (Schneider and Logan,
2007) nor the contingency hypothesis (Kopp and Wessel, 2011)
received support from the P3a results obtained in this study.
Inspection of Figure 5 reveals that transition switch cues, but
not task switch cues, evoked small enhancements of frontal
P3a waves. However, the main effect of cue explicitness in
the corresponding ANOVA is difficult to interpret, given the
significant interaction between the number of tasks and cue
explicitness. Further, the non-significance of cue explicitness
effects on two-task conditions suggests that cue explicitness
exerts rather marginal effects on P3a amplitude variability, and
that they may be difficult to obtain (but see West et al., 2011). The
contingency hypothesis (Kopp and Wessel, 2011) was incorrect
insofar as it held that P3a amplitude enhancements should be
restricted to C/FB-stimuli on feedback-based task switching.
This prediction was clearly disconfirmed, since FB-stimuli on
prospectively-signaled task switching evoked P3a waves of similar
amplitude. This result indicates that the unique combination of
task information and performance feedback by C/FB-stimuli is
not necessary for obtaining a prominent P3a in response to switch
outcome events. In conclusion, the main P3a findings of this
study are that amplitude variability in P3a is (a) feedback-locked,
and (b) related to the uncertainty of switch outcomes.
A NOTE ON THE EFFECTS OF OUTCOME VALENCE ON ERP WAVEFORMS
Amplitude variability in the feedback-related negativity (FRN)
is a frequent subject in ERP studies of outcome processing and
feedback-guided learning (see San Martín, 2012, for review). The
FRN is a frontally distributed negative ERP component (around
250ms after outcome presentation) which tends to be larger for
negative than for positive outcomes (i.e., the outcome valence
effect on amplitude variability in FRN). Holroyd and Coles (2002)
proposed that the FRN is a scalp-recorded index of a neuronal
system for reinforcement learning (RL; Sutton and Barto, 1998).
However, inspection of Figure 5 reveals that outcome valence
(which could only be analyzed in the two uncertain switching
conditions) did obviously not evoke FRN-like amplitude variabil-
ity in the current study.
In this study, a P3b, rather than a FRN, outcome valence effect
was observed (with a larger P3b elicited by negative outcomes).
San Martín (2012) concluded that there are inconsistent find-
ings in the literature regarding the relationship between outcome
valence and amplitude variability in P3b. We suggest that the
effect of outcome valence on the P3b might result from another
variable, since negative, but not positive, outcomes signal the need
for additional task-set switches (see Table 2). Thus, negative out-
comes, but not positive outcomes, serve as switch cues, and the
apparent outcome valence effect may simply be another instance
of switch-related amplitude variability in P3b.
TOWARD A THEORETICAL INTEGRATION OF UNCERTAINTY AND
COGNITIVE CONTROL
The results of our study imply that switch-related P3b and P3a
are dissociable, with regard to their scalp topography and to
their antecedent conditions (P3b: cue-locked and modified by
switch surprise, irrespective of switch entropy; P3a: feedback-
locked and modified by switch entropy). These ERP data await
comprehensive theoretical treatment, which is outlined below.
The theoretical fundament is provided by Sokolov’s (1966)
entropy model of the orienting response (OR), which analysed the
dependence of the OR (a) on the statistical properties of the sig-
nals and (b) on their information content (see also Velden, 1974).
Let et denote an event e at time t, P(et/Sj) be the probability of e at
t in case of one of several hypothetical states Sj{with j = 1, . . . , n},
P(Sj/et) be the posterior probability of a particular state Sj given
e at t, and P(Sj) be the prior probability of the state Sj. Then,
according to Bayes’ theorem
P(Sj/et) = (P(et/Sj) × P(Sj))/P(et). (9)
Thus, Sokolov’s model is first of all a Bayesian model (Knill
and Pouget, 2004; Doya et al., 2007; Friston, 2010; Vilares and
Körding, 2011; Penny, 2012) of the OR. Further, the degree
of uncertainty is determined by the entropy over the proba-
bility distribution of posterior probabilities of all hypothetical
states, i.e.,
H(Sj= 1...n/et) = −(P(S1/et) log2 P(S1/et) + . . .
+P(Sn/et) log2 P(Sn/et)). (10)
According to Sokolov (1966), the OR arises when the uncertainty
of the situation, depending on the number of hypothetical
states, reaches the threshold value, i.e., when H(Sj= 1...n/et) >
threshold, and the OR lasts until the uncertainty is eliminated
and H(Sj= 1...n/et) < threshold 1. Further, Sokolov introduced
the term “enquiries” to describe conditioned orienting reactions
to information-carrying signals, i.e., a “selective concentration
of attention at definite moments in time” (Sokolov, 1966, p.353).
Conditioned orienting reactions are not evoked by the level of
entropy as such (which is nevertheless necessarily required), “but
1Sokolov (1966) used the labels Kj and Ai rather than et and Sj, respectively.
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its change anticipated at a given moment in time” (Sokolov,
1966, p.353).
Sokolov’s (1966) entropy model of conditioned orienting reac-
tions can be applied directly to uncertain task switching. Here,
uncertain switch cues induce entropy, whereas uncertain switch
outcomes eliminate entropy. Thus, viewed from the perspective
of Sokolov’s (1966) model, the elicitation of a P3a by uncer-
tain switch outcomes is equivalent to a conditioned orienting
reaction, an attentional focusing at that moment in time when
an information-carrying (entropy-eliminating) signal was antic-
ipated. In that context, it is of interest that the P3a component
of the ERP has often been considered as indicating the brain’s
OR (e.g., Friedman et al., 2001; Barceló et al., 2002; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2011). Further, our analysis is very similar to Barceló
et al.’s (2006) P3a entropy hypothesis. However, a subtle difference
between these two models lies in the fact that our model does not
relate the P3a in uncertain task-switching paradigms to stimuli
which convey entropy (i.e., uncertain switch cues), but rather to
stimuli which eliminate entropy (i.e., uncertain switch outcomes).
Figure 7 shows a possible application of Sokolov’s (1966)
entropy model in the context of a hierarchical model of task con-
trol (Mayr et al., 2013), which specifies task-level and meta-level
components. As an initial approximation, a simple actor-critic
architecture (Sutton and Barto, 1998) is assumed at the task level
(with P3b being related to the surprise over switches, FRN being
related to negative outcomes). Perception of event e at time t
(et) activates processing at the task level, and it simultaneously
initiates processing in the multi-faceted orienting system (OS),
which leads under two different conditions to an OR: (1) If et
is entropy-inducing (ei) and unexpected, i.e., P(ei(t)) < α (with
α → 0), under a non-entropic measure at time t, i.e., Ht ≤ γ. (2)
If et is entropy-eliminating (ee) and expected, i.e., P(ee(t)) > β
(with β → 1), under an entropic measure at delayed time t-1,
i.e., Ht−1 > γ. In case (1), a reactive orienting response (rOR) is
evoked, whereas a proactive orienting response (pOR) is released
in case (2). rORs and pORs may activate ORs by partly differ-
ent neuronal mechanisms. Their final common pathway involves
“selective concentration of attention at definite moments in time”
(Sokolov, 1966, p.353), applied to et , and measurable as P3a.
Further, the OS serves as a switch from task control at the
task level to task control at the meta level (Nelson and Narens,
1990; Dosenbach et al., 2008; Tsujimoto et al., 2011; Fleming
and Dolan, 2012; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012; Petersen and Posner,
2012; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012). One of the functions of
FIGURE 7 | An application of Sokolov’s (1966) entropy model of the
orienting response to task switching. An actor-critic architecture (Sutton
and Barto, 1998) is assumed at the task level (white frames; with P3b being
related to the surprise over switches, FRN being related to negative
outcomes). Perception of event e at time t (et ) activates processing at the
task level, and it initiates processing in the multi-faceted orienting system
(OS; light gray frames), which leads under two different conditions to an
orienting response (OR): (1) If et is entropy-inducing (ei ) and unexpected, i.e.,
P(ei(t)) < α (with α →0), under a non-entropic measure at time t, i.e., Ht < γ.
(2) If et is entropy-eliminating (ee ) and expected, i.e., P(ee(t)) > β (with
β → 1), under an entropic measure at delayed time t-1, i.e., Ht−1 > γ. In case
(1), a reactive orienting response (rOR) is evoked, whereas a proactive
orienting response (pOR) is released in case (2). Further, the OS serves as a
switch from task control at the task level to task control at the meta level. One
of the functions of meta-level processing is to estimate the current state of
the environment from a number of hypothetical states, i.e., to dynamically
model state transitions which occur in the environment (turquoise frames).
Hence, the meta level is considered being “model-based,” whereas the task
level is considered being “model-free.” Computationally, state estimation is
equivalent to solving inverse problems. Once a state has been estimated, the
meta level of task control is able to bias the actor toward adequate
stimulus-response mappings. In its application to task switching, task control
is exerted at the task level as long as Ht < γ (e.g., during task runs). When
P(ei(t)) < α is not met, entropy-inducing switch cues fail to evoke a rOR.
However, entropy-eliminating switch outcomes are expected to occur at time
t, i.e., P(ee(t)) > β, under the delayed entropic measure, Ht−1 > γ, which is a
consequence of the occurrence of entropy-inducing switch cues at time t-1.
Therefore, the uncertainty-related P3a qualifies as a pOR (also labeled
conditioned orienting reaction, cf. Sokolov, 1966). O, organism; E,
environment; RL, reinforcement learning; FRN, feedback-related negativity.
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meta-level processing is to estimate the current state of the
environment from a number of hypothetical states, i.e., to dynam-
ically model state transitions which occur in the environment.
Hence, the meta level is considered being “model-based,” whereas
the task level is considered being “model-free” (Johnson and
Donchin, 1982; Daw et al., 2005; Behrens et al., 2007; Gläscher
et al., 2010; Summerfield et al., 2011; Pearson and Platt, 2012).
Computationally, state estimation is equivalent to solving inverse
problems (Dayan et al., 1995; Friston, 2010; Kopp, 2012), puta-
tively by Bayesian probability inversion (Sokolov, 1966; Kopp,
2008). Once a state has been estimated, the meta level of task con-
trol is able to bias the actor toward adequate stimulus-response
mappings (Nelson and Narens, 1990).
In its application to task switching, task control is exerted
at the task level as long as Ht ≤ γ (e.g., during task runs).
When P(ei(t)) < α is not met, entropy-inducing switch cues fail
to evoke a rOR. However, entropy-eliminating switch outcomes
are expected to occur at time t, i.e., P(ee(t)) > β, under the
delayed entropic measure, Ht−1 > γ, which is a consequence
of the occurrence of entropy-inducing switch cues at time t-1.
Therefore, the uncertainty-related P3a qualifies as a pOR (also
labeled conditioned orienting reaction, cf. Sokolov, 1966).
Shimamura (2008) mapped task-level and meta-level process-
ing to distinct cortical regions. Specifically, he assigned task-level
control to areas within the posterior cortex (PC), whereas meta-
level control should be associated with areas within the prefrontal
cortex (PFC). Meta-level cognitive processes, placed at the top
of the cognitive hierarchy (Kopp, 2012), are expected to be sup-
ported by the anterior PFC, a region being a possible top level
node of task control because progressively rostral PFC regions
support progressively higher levels of the cognitive hierarchy
(Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre, 2008; Badre et al., 2009, 2010).
The frontopolar cortex (FPC) is the most anterior part of
the PFC. An understanding of FPC cognitive functions remains
elusive, yet the FPC has been implicated in several cognitive
functions, such as prospective memory (Simons et al., 2006), gat-
ing external and internal influences on cognition (Burgess et al.,
2007), establishing task sets (Sakai, 2008), decision making (Soon
et al., 2008) and evaluating outcomes of decisions (Ramnani et al.,
2004; Boorman et al., 2009). Tsujimoto et al. (2010) reported
single-cell activity in FPC, demonstrating that some FPC neurons
encoded decisions when feedback approached, thereby suggesting
a role of FPC in evaluating decisions. According to Fleming and
co-workers, individual differences in structure (Fleming et al.,
2010) and function (Fleming et al., 2012) of the right rostral
PFC correlated with the accuracy of confidence reports in per-
ceptual decision making paradigms. Fleming et al. suggested that
this region of the anterior PFC re-represents decision uncertainty,
to facilitate reportable confidence in task performance. Here we
propose, albeit speculatively, that neuronal activity in the FPC
contributes to amplitude variability in uncertainty-related P3a
which in turn is associated with pOR-supported elimination of
entropy over hypothetical states, as described above.
CONCLUSION
P3b and P3a waveforms represent separate electrophysiologi-
cal markers of dissociable aspects of cognitive control in task-
switching paradigms.Whereas parietal P3b waveforms are related
to surprise over switches at the task level, frontally distributed
P3a waveforms seem to be specifically related to the process-
ing of uncertain switch outcomes at the meta level (functionally
described as proactive orienting responses). P3a activities may
computationally be related to the formation of inverse mod-
els of dynamic environments, as originally described by Sokolov
(1966). One implication of the current research is the hypoth-
esis that brain lesions affecting the OS lead to deficient con-
textual adjustment, a pervasive behavioral disturbance which
represents one of the hallmarks of executive dysfunctions (Kopp,
2012).
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